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Introduction
The study of urbanisation, together with that of
migration, has placed its practitioners at the
crossroads of two major strands of 'developmental'
thought. One concerns the anthropological and
sociological literature exploring how the poor
survive under the constraints of underdeveloped
capitalist economies. The other is the historical and
economic literature on state policies, unequal
exchange, and the system insertion of countries
within world capitalism. The line of reasoning I wish
to explore in this paper offers some promise of
articulating both levels in a manner which goes
beyond the perennial recognition that 'micro' and
'macro' structural phenomena are somehow related.
The relevance of this issue to the new emphasis placed
by international agencies on 'basic needs' as an
approach to development lies in clarifying the way
such 'needs' have been taken care of so far in many
underdeveloped countries and, more importantly,
the way such strategies for survival articulate with
the requirements of the capitalist economy.
My subject in this paper is the Informal economy' or
'informal sector'. My argument cart, in part, be
interpreted as a defence of the concept against
accusations of irrelevance or academic voguism. On
the contrary, L suggest that the concept of the
'informal economy' is fundamental to understanding
the operations of capitalism as a world phenomenon
and constitutes a missing element in contemporary
'world-system' formulations of relationships between
core and periphery. The data on which this
proposition is based come, primarily, from a series of
recent field studies conducted in different countries of
Latin America.1
Earlier formulations defined the informal economy as
the way the marginal poor took care of themselves in
the city. Squatter settlements, which served as bei
for much informal economic activity, lost the stigma
of the past since they did not represent problems, but
'solutions to the problem'. Later studies observed,
however, that the informal sector was more than an
exercise in-self-preservation: the 'marginais' turned
out to be profoundly integrated in the production,
distribution, and consumption structures of the city.
1 See, for example, Roberts in Portes and Browning teds.) 1976;
Mangin 1967: UzzelI in Cornelius and Trueblood (eds.) 1974;
Peattie 1968; Leeds and Leeds in Field (cd.) 1969; Lornmitz 1977).
Studies ri Ciudad Guayana, Rio de Janeiro, and
Mexico City, among others, showed how close was
the interdependence between shantytown economies
and those of the broader city.
Those studies went on to note the profound
dependence of informal economic activities on
decisions, events, and resources in the formal sector.
This assertion holds when seen from the point of view
of the individual shantytown worker or petty
entrepreneur. From the point of view of the dominant
economic system, however, the opposite is more
accurate. The organisation of 'formal' capitalism in
peripheral underdeveloped countries appears to be
dependent on the informal sector, and this dependence
extends beyond the way workers in that sector take
care of their own needs. Further, the hypothesis can
be advanced that functional effects of informal
economies reach, through a series of interlinked
mechanisms, to the very centres of capitalist
accuniulation.
Wage-levels in centre and periphery
It is generally accepted that the percentage of the
labour force of advanced industrial countries which
j; fully 'proletarianised'i.e. fully dependent for its
reproduction as labour on monetary wagesis
higher than that in peripheral countries. Lt is also
generally agreed that real wage levels in the core
capitalist countries are higher, on average, than those
in the periphery for exactly the same type and amount
of work.
Why labour irt core economies is more dependent on
wages and why those wages are higher come down, in
the ultimate analysis, to the same thing. Though the
argument can take many forms, the recent
formulation by Alain de Janvry (1976-77) is the most
useful for present purposes:
Profits to capital depend on maintenance of wages
paid to workers at a minimum relative to productivity.
Actualisation of money profits depends, however, on
the sale of the product. The process of capital
accumùlation entails a constant growth in productive
capacity, a trend which constantly outstrips demand.
The market for core capitalist production is also, by
and large, a 'core' market. Expanding that market to
avert or attenuate crises of over-production means
putting more money in the hands of the mass of
consumers. Pressures to expand the internal market
thus lead to incorporation of remaining 'subsistence
redoubts' into the money economy and to higher
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wages. lt is this organic integration of profus and
wages in core economies which, in part, counteracts
the downward pressure on wages. Surplus obtained
by exploiting workers can not be actualised without
selling the product to other workers.
This 'organic' nexus disappears under peripheral
capitalism for the fundamental reason that the
hegemonie sector in these economies produces for
export. Profits, in other words, are actualised by sale
in markets abroad, rather than within the country.
While domestic enterprises and branches of
multinational enterprises also produce fora restricted
internal market, their existence is ultimately
dependcnt on export earnings. Nor is this situation
limited to countries exporting agricultural products
and materials; the more industrialised peripheral
countries have also become increasingly dependent
on manufactured exports to sustain their internal
economies.2
Under these conditions, downward pressure on
wages is not counteracted by pressures to expand the
internal market. The logic of peripheral capitalism is
one where profits are maximised by keeping labour
costs at a minimum. Cheap labour is indeed what
gives many peripheral countries a 'competitive edge'
in the international market. The pressure on wages is
reflected in two aspects: first, actual restrictions in the
consumption levels of workers and, second, a
continuous attempt to cheapen their consumption,
that is, to transfer part of the costs of their
reproduction to other economic units.
Labour costs
The question of why wage levels in central and
peripheral capitalist economies must differ is not
identical to that of how peripheral labour costs are
kept low. Two strategies are suggested by the
existing literature: the first is the use of a reserve
army of labour. This strategy tends to inhibit the
upward movement of wages, thus keeping consump-
tion levels low. The second consists of subsidising
wages paid by capitalist enterprises through the use
2 For Brazilsee Bacha (1976) and Baer (1975); for Mexico Blair (1974)
and Rhodes in Wilber (cd.) (1973).
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of workers from the rural subsistence sector.
Workers reared in villages, under subsistence
conditions, come to work for wages in mines,
plantations, and urban plants, and the wages paid
cover only the reproduction of the worker while
employed. Collectively, moreover, capitalist enter-
prises save the costs of supporting workers during
their early unproductive years (Meillassoux 1972;
Meillassoux cited in Clammer in Oxaal, Barnett and
Booth (eds.) 1975).
This 'subsidy' of subsistence to capitalist economies
is compounded when the worker ceases to be useful
and is forced to return to the village. By shifting
replacement and welfare costs onto the subsistence
sector, capitalist enterprises in the periphery save a
significant part of the real wage bill. In other words,
the co-existence of subsistence and capitalist modes
of production enables capitalist enterprises to
exploit not only the labour of the worker, but that of
his kin in the village, as the latter are forced to
provide for his needs during periods of idleness and
old age.
The reserve army and subsistence transfer strategies
do not suffice, however, to explain fully the situation
in many peripheral societies. Latin American
countries, in particular, present a situation where
subsistence economies have a diminishing and, in
some cases, vestigial importance. For most Latin
American countries, it would be risky indeed to
affirm that villages producing for subsistence
provide the bulk of labour for enterprises in the
capitalist sector, or that they fully subsidise its
welfare costs. As to the reserve army argument, it
should be remembered that a considerable proportion
of employed labour in the formal capitalist sector
consists of skilled workers. More importantly,
workers in the formal sector are those to which
protective legislation most directly applies and those
most capable of deriving support from existing labour
organisations.
Despite the restricted effectiveness of the above
mechanisms in many peripheral countries, wages
continue to be comparatively low, even for skilled
labour. Cases such as Brazil, provide a compelling
illustration of the disparity (see below).
Comparative Wage Scales
(US $ per hour1975)
Brazil Japan Germany Belgium UK Italy USA
Unki1led labour 024 074 127 134 096 0'67 300
Light assembly 032 065 140 l42 082 072 289
Machine operator 068 Ø68 150 164 101 086 3'24
Maintenance mechanic O'65 Ø78 l60 l83 142 092 329
Toolmaker ...... 08l 079 173 i87 1'61 IO2 5.03
Source A. Brown and J. P. Ford, Brazil: Today's Business Opportunity, London, 1975 :124
An additional mechanism must exist. Though
political repression of working class demands has
certainly proved effective in the short-run, a more
stable and less overt mode of controlling labour costs
is needed. The means to sustain effective downward
pressures on labour costs can not be provided solely
by an economic sector of decreasing relative
importance, such as subsistence agriculture, but
requires one whose growth accompanies that of
capitalism itself.
Class structure and the informal economy
For purposes of the argument, the class structure of a
peripheral society can be crudely divided into four
groups:
Class I Owners, managers, and top-level state
administrators
Class 2 Non-manual workers: clerks, technicians
and salaried professionals
Class 3 Manual workers in public and private
enterprises
Class 4 Enformal sector workers
The first three classes comprise the formal sector. The
interests of the first class are, however, structurally
contrary to those of the other two. Class I members
are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the rate of
profit. While for some this may be tied to expansion
of the internal market, the structure of peripheral
capitalism leads to the dominance of export-
oriented enterprises and interests. This means an
unmitigated downward pressure on the portion of the
product going as salaries and wages to Classes 2 and
3. The increase in the share of the product of formal
capitalist enterprises going as profits to Class I can
thus be managed in two ways: decreasing the
consumption levels of Classes 2 and 3 or decreasing
the costs of inputs consumed by these classes.
Individual actors and enterprises in the informal
sector have been defined according to a number of
characteristics. Bryan Roberts (1976) however,
identifies their two most significant characteristics.
First, they are labour intensive; second, they avoid
formal state supervision and regulation. These
combine substantially to reduce the 'input' costs of
whatever goods or services are produced, thereby
cheapening the price of the outputs. Long and
strenuous hours are contributed by the individual
himself, by unpaid kin, and by others in his informal
network of friends and acquaintances. Absence of
state supervision means, first of all, greater ease in
avoiding taxation; it also means avoiding the rigidities
of labour legislation. Informal sector workers are
seldom paid the official minimum wage, nor do they
have access to health insurance, unemployment
compensation, old-age pensions, and other indirect
benefits. Hiring and laying off is done on a much
more casual basis, according to need.
The competitive edge' of the informal sector in
relation to the formal one in peripheral countries
parallels the 'edge' that the peripheral country as a
whole has in relation to core capitalist nations in the
international economy. En both cases, it is based on
access to cheaper sources of labour.
Depending on the specific situation, the relationship
between the classes above may be defined as one in
which Class i--the ownersuse Class 4--the
informal sectoragainst the intermediate classes, or
as one in which Class 1 allows Classes 2 and 3 to
exploit Class 4. thereby cheapening their costs of
consumption and reducing upward pressure on
wages. In whatever version, the fundamental point is
that the informal sector subsidises part of the costs of
formal capitalist enterprises in peripheral countries,
enabling them to enforce comparatively low wages
on their own labour. The basic needs of formal sector
workers are partially met by goods and services
produced using unpaid or more cheaply paid informal
labour. Paralleling the mechanism of subsistence
transfer, hut in a far more diversified and complex
manner, the capitalist sector is thus able to exploit
not only the work energy of the worker, but that of
his kin, neighbours, and friends as well,
Uses of informal labour
Let us consider the hypothetical case of a worker
employed in a soft drink plant in a large Latin
American city. He lives in a fairly good house in one
of the local shantytowns. He probably could afford
rented rooms or even a small house in the city, but he
would get less comfortable quarters for a high price.
En the shantytown, he pays no rent. He probably
bought the lot through informal contract and built
the house with materials purchased locally over a
period of time. Let's assume he has a wife, three
children, an unemployed sister, and an aging mother.
The children go to a state school. To supplement the
family income, the women set up a little business. It
might be a front-room store in the house or a cheap
food stand somewhere in the city. The initial small
investment comes from the man's wages. The family
also raises a pig or two and a few chickens.
Food is seldom bought in the supermarket, but locally
from petty merchants who give credit. Eggs, milk,
and other products may be bought from individual
neighbours. Vegetables and meat come, at times, from
the village. Clothing is almost always second-hand,
bought cheap or given by families in the city and re-
fitted by the women or the shantytown tailor. The
house has electricity, a radio, and television.
Electricity is either bought legally, purchased from a
neighbour, or tapped illegally. Appliances and other
items of furniture might have been bought in long-
term instalments from a store in town; most likely,
however, they were obtained second-hand through
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informal contacts and repaired locally. Appliance
repairs and all similar services are always done in
small shops in the shantytown or linked through
social contacts with it.
The lives of wage-workers in the private and state
sectors in peripheral countries are conditioned at
every step by their relationships with the informal
economy. Though those workers are also consumers
of formal sector goods, a substantial proportion of
their needs are satisfied by informal sources. This is
especially true of services but also extends to goods,
such as food and refurbished durables. The relative
cheapness of these goods and services is what enables
the worker to meet his basic needs and even save,
within the constraints of a meagre wage. His savings
may, in turn, initiate other family-based informal
enterprises.
The shantytown or squatter settlement is the
physical counterpart and the most common living
environment of the class of informal sector workers.
Its very size has forced a rupture in the rules of
conventional urban land speculation, reducing
housing costs for both informal and formal sector
workers (Lomnitz 1977; Lomnitz in Portes and
Browning (eds.) 1976; Collier 1976; Turner 1968;
Mangin 1967). Shantytown housing thus represents a
major indirect subsidy to wages, passed on and
ultimately benefiting owners in the formal sector.
This subsidy, like most others provided by the
informal economy, depends on the physical
contiguity of formal and informal sector workers. In
the shantytown the two groups are indistinguishable,
with the same individuals frequently alternating
between periods of formal and informal employment
or simultaneously holding jobs in both sectors. At
first glance, this symbiotic relationship appears as
evidence of the dependence of informal activities on
thoney wages. The opposite is, however, more
accurate as the consumption 'yield' of wages is
multiplied by informal sources of supply.
This subsidy-to-consumption is not limited to Class 3
workers. The same applies, albeit less directly, to
clerks, technicians, and professionals. Though there
is less empirical evidence on this point, Class 2
workers appear to make use, in a vast number of
ways, of informal sector goods and services. Cheap
and abundant domestic labour is but the most
visible evidence of the subsidy to middle-class
consumption provided by the informal economy.
While available studies concentrate on the political
symbiosis between the middle-classes and the
shantytown, anyone familiar with Latin American
cities knows that access and coi1surnpion of goods
and services outside the formal economy is an
everyday practice in middle-class households.
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The 'cheapness of labour' for formal capitalist
enterprises is thus partly a consequence of the
'cheapness of life', based in turn on everyday
transactions with the informal economy. This
subsidy-to-consumption is probably the most
important, but not the only role played by informal
sector workers.
Not surprisingly, Class I owners and rnnagers have
reached down to the informal economy in order to
by-pass the costs of expanding employment of Class
3 workers. The revival of the 'pLit-out' or 'maquila'
system in peripheral shantytowns of Mexico City is a
case in point. As described by Lomnitz (1977A)
production is farmed out, usually via an inter-
mediary, to shantytown workers receiving less than
the minimum wage and no indirect benefits
compensation: In one variant, clothing materials are
distributed to women working at home who are paid
a piece-rate for finished articles. In another,
construction workers are recruited by an informal
contractor and organised to perform a particular job.
In a third, firms recruit and organise children and
women to market brand-name products in the streets.
Coaclusion: marginality and the world economy
The rapid increase in social research on the 'urban
poor', the 'marginaIs', the 'shantytown', and finally
the 'informal sector' in Latin America has helped
develop, over a period of a few years, a major body of
knowledge about a previously ignored group. At the
local level, the picture appears more or less complete,
at least in the present conjuncture. However, the
articulation of this working-class population within
an international economic order remains problem-
atic.
Recent advances in the literature owe much to social
scientists working close to the field. Researchers
repeatedly found that 'marginaIs' did not form an
inert mass, but were in fact quite adept at turning
their restricted opportunities to advantage. The
rationality of the urban poor was highlighted and the
mythologies of the pastradical anger and the
'culture of poverty'effectively discredited.
The next step was the discovery that the economic
activities of the 'marginal' population were not
conducted in isolation, but were in fact closely
articulated with those of the dominant economy. At
this pOint, the concept of 'informal sector' gained
increasing acceptance. Earlier formulations defined
the informal sector as interstitial: it operated in the
gaps of economic opportunity left by formal
enterprises. The theory was that the informal
economy owed its dynam I sm to the st! II nconi plete
and imperfect penetration of caplialisni in the
periphery. A corollary was t ha t t he informal economy
represented a transitioiial phenomenon, since the
growing consolidation of capitalism would eventually
deny its raison d'f2tre.
Later years have brought no evidence of the
weakening of the informal sector and have, in fact,
produced new findings indicating that its role in the
economy is far more central than originally thought.
But while convincingly denying the interstitial
character of the informal economy, recent studies
still insist that its existence and dynamism are
dependent on the formal sector. This argument
stands the situation on its head: though there exists a
symbiotic relationship between the two, from the
standpoint of basic structural arrangements the
opposite is the case.
Recent analyses from the world system perspective
have shown with great clarity reasons for the
sustained peripheral éxpansion of central capitalist
economies (Wallerstein and Hopkins 1977; WaIler-
stein 1977: 29-40; for an earlier statement see also
Magdoff 1969). The argument complements that of
de Janvry, summarised above: the need to prevent
and attenuate downward turns in core economies
leads to sustained pressures for market expansion.
This, in turn, means increased proletarianisation of
the labour force. A labour force which is
proletarianised--that is, fully dependent on money
wages--is one which, sooner or later, organises and
makes demands. Thus, to the upward pressure on
wages created by the economic needs of capital
accumulation, are added those created by the
political need for social stability.
Co-opting workers in the core economies can only be
achieved through transferring costs. According to the
theory, capitalism as a world system has been able to
achieve market expansion and social stability in the
centres by constantly expanding its activities in the
periphery. High consumption by some workers has
thus been subsidised by sustained exploitation of
others.
The theory draws a blank, however, when it comes to
explaining how disparities between core and
peripheral wages can be indefinitely maintained. It
argues, at most, that this depends on the use of a
semi-proletarianised labour force whose reproduc-
tion is partially subsidised by subsistence enclaves.
As seen aboyé, this mechanism is inadequate to
explain conditions in Latin America and, probably,
in the more industrialised peripheral economies
elsewhere.
It is from this perspective that the literature on the
dynamics of informal economies acquires its full
meaning. The informal sectora vast network of
activities artjculatcd with, but not limited to
remaining subsistence enclaveshas implications
which go beyond the peripheral countries. Direct
subsidies to consumption provided by informal to
formal sector workers within a particular peripheral
country are also indirect subsidies to core-nation
workers and, hence, means to maintain the rate of
profit. Thus, through a series of mechanisms well-
hidden from public view, the apparently isolated
labour of shantytown workers can be registered as
gain in the financial houses of New York and
London.
The concrete forms that this transfer takes range from
low-price raw materials and foodstuffs to an
increasing flow of cheap manufactures. Meeting
basic and perhaps not-so-basic needs of workers in
the fully monetised capitalist sectors is a process
partially dependent on the labour of workers whose
basic needs are either not met or met outside the
money economy. lt is this situation which raises
doubts about naive policies designed to increase the
standard of living' of the poorest (informal) sector
workers in underdeveloped countries or incorporate
them fully into the money economy.
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